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All NEMO Committee consultation on Harmonised maximum and minimum clearing prices for single day-ahead coupling and for single intraday coupling, pursuant article 12 of CACM Regulation

A Eurelectric response paper

July 2022

Eurelectric represents the interests of the electricity industry in Europe. Our work covers all major issues affecting our sector. Our members represent the electricity industry in over 30 European countries.

We cover the entire industry from electricity generation and markets to distribution networks and customer issues. We also have affiliates active on several other continents and business associates from a wide variety of sectors with a direct interest in the electricity industry.

We stand for

The vision of the European power sector is to enable and sustain:
- A vibrant competitive European economy, reliably powered by clean, carbon-neutral energy
- A smart, energy efficient and truly sustainable society for all citizens of Europe

We are committed to lead a cost-effective energy transition by:

investing in clean power generation and transition-enabling solutions, to reduce emissions and actively pursue efforts to become carbon-neutral well before mid-century, taking into account different starting points and commercial availability of key transition technologies;

transforming the energy system to make it more responsive, resilient and efficient. This includes increased use of renewable energy, digitalisation, demand side response and reinforcement of grids so they can function as platforms and enablers for customers, cities and communities;

accelerating the energy transition in other economic sectors by offering competitive electricity as a transformation tool for transport, heating and industry;

embedding sustainability in all parts of our value chain and take measures to support the transformation of existing assets towards a zero carbon society;

innovating to discover the cutting-edge business models and develop the breakthrough technologies that are indispensable to allow our industry to lead this transition.

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WG Market Integration & Network Codes

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Consultation Overview

The methodologies in accordance with Art. 41(2) and Art. 54 (2) of CACM determining the harmonized minimum and maximum clearing prices (HMMCP) to be applied in all bidding zones for single day-ahead coupling and for single intraday coupling respectively, were last approved by ACER on 14 November 2017. There have been no amendments to the two methodologies since as no need to amend has been identified in previous review. This is a joint consultation from all NEMOs.

According to Article 4 (3) for both the HMMCP methodologies respectively, '*the NEMOs shall, at least every two years, reassess the HMMCP, share this assessment with all market participants and consult it in the relevant stakeholder forums organized in accordance with Article 11 of the CACM Regulation.*'

The harmonized maximum clearing price for SDAC was raised by 1000 EUR/MWh up to 4000 EUR/MWh as the relevant threshold was recently reached in one bidding zone. Indeed, the current market situation calls for a more thorough review of the methodology. Some market participants already expressed some ideas on maximum and minimum prices for SDAC and SIDC.

The implementation of Intraday Auctions (IDAs) also requires to introduce a definition of HMMCP for IDAs into the HMMCP methodology for SIDC.

Out of scope of the consultation

- the principle that maximum and minimum clearing prices remain harmonized in all bidding zones
- the principle that a dynamic increase of the maximum and minimum clearing prices shall be in place

What happens next

During the months of June and July, the responses will be reviewed and in accordance with Article 12.3 of CACM GL duly considered in the process of revising and proposing amendments to the HMMCP methodologies before sent to ACER for review and approval. Audience Market participants, TSOs and NRAs Interests CACM GL related to SDAC and SIDC

Questions

We welcome this all NEMOs consultation on the HMMCP methodologies for single day-ahead coupling (SDAC) and single intraday coupling (SIDC). The involvement of market participants in the implementation process of EU guidelines and network codes is crucial.

Before answering to the questions of the public consultation, we would like to make some general remarks:

(a) Relation to the current European market situation: The timing of this consultation falls during a crisis period with unprecedent high electricity prices in Europe. Knowing this, the proposals, reasoning, and decisions to be held and taken within the framework of the possible amendments to the HMMCP methodologies for SDAC and SIDC shall not be

biased by the current situation and respect the principles of Electricity Regulation and CACM Regulation.

(b) Free price formation and justified reasons for price limits: We would like to remind our support to free formation of electricity prices which notably guarantees the optimal dispatching of the available assets. Pursuant to Electricity Regulation Article 10, technical limits in the DA and ID timeframe "shall be sufficiently high so as not to unnecessarily restrict trade, shall be harmonized for the internal market and shall take into account the maximum value of lost load". For technical and operational reasons, we believe that technical price limits are justified as a possible way (i) to avoid outstanding impacts in case of IT issues, operational errors, or corrupted input data in the EU market coupling algorithms and (ii) to limit risks / financial impacts related to the management of collaterals requested by power exchanges and/or trading limits. The detrimental impact on market participants of maintaining unnecessarily high max clearing prices in auction markets, be they held in the DA or ID timeframes, should be duly considered in order not to limit market access, and negatively affect market liquidity.

(c) Consistency and hierarchy of price limits across timeframe: We believe that there should be a consistency of maximum and minimum clearing prices across timeframe, respecting an increasing rule for maximum clearing prices with respect to the timeframe when approaching real time (that is $0 \leq maxDA \leq maxID \leq maxBAL$) and a decreasing rule for minimum clearing prices with respect to the timeframe when approaching real time (that is $0 \geq minDA \geq minID \geq minBAL$).

- Indeed, being closer to real time means being closer to potential real physical scarcity or over-supply which only is discovered/realized in the real-time time frame (balancing). Electricity prices should reflect market fundamentals.
- The market sequence should therefore allow that a scarcity or over-supply revealed at a given time step is (partially or totally) corrected at a subsequent time step by allowing a broader range of prices, which is only possible if the hierarchy described above is respected.
- In other words, the max price limit should allow scarcity prices to manifest. And in a symmetrical way, the min price limits should allow over-supply to manifest.
- This implies in particular that minimum and maximum prices in the balancing timeframe should serve as upper/lower bounds for the evolutions of minimum and maximum prices on SDAC and SIDC.

4. When integrating HMMCP for Intraday Auctions, NEMOs propose to follow the same principles as for SDAC. This means a differentiation from HMMCP for the SIDC continuous. What is your view on that differentiation, and do you have a view on what maximum and minimum clearing price should be applied for SIDC IDAs and what mechanism for possible upward or downward adjustment of that maximum and minimum clearing price should be applied?

Maximum and minimum clearing prices to be applied for pan-EU IDAs (which will be put in place pursuant to ACER Decision 01/2019) shall be consistent with those applied in SIDC continuous and respect the principles under point (c) presented in the introduction.

- Max/min clearing prices for pan-EU IDAs shall be equal to those applied in SIDC continuous, as a matter of consistency in terms of price formation in the intraday timeframe.
- The same rule for increasing the SIDC maximum clearing price in the event that the max clearing price for SDAC is increased above the max clearing price for SIDC shall be

applied for pan-EU IDAs. In such a case, as in current HMMCP methodology for SIDC continuous, the max clearing price for SIDC IDAs shall also increase to be equal to the max clearing price for SDAC.

- A rule could be added to increase the SIDC continuous and IDAs maximum clearing prices when a certain percentage of the SIDC max clearing price in force is reached in at least one market time unit in a day in a single bidding zone. The percentage and the increment step could be the same as the one used for the SDAC.

Finally, the same principle in terms of scope and application as in Article 1 and 5 of the HMMCP for SIDC continuous shall be applied to IDAs: maximum and minimum clearing pricing shall be applied in all bidding zones which participate to pan-EU IDAs and NEMOs shall implement the HMMCP for SIDC IDAs immediately.

5. The current methodologies describe a dynamic process to increase the maximum clearing price if market prices reach certain thresholds. NEMOs would like to consult on the possibility to also implement a decrease of the maximum clearing price after a period when no thresholds have been exceeded and the maximum clearing price shows to be unnecessarily high.

In any case, the rule of an automatic decrease of the max clearing price shall be designed in such a way to respect Article 10 of Electricity Regulation, that is not to hinder free price formation.

We see some reasons to support such a proposal, at least for the SDAC.

- Collateral requirements and/or trading limits can be impacted by maintaining high max clearing prices. The management of those constraints induces some risks for market participants without clear benefits in terms of functioning of electricity markets and in particular free price formation. This would justify returning to a lower max clearing price limit, in particular for SDAC, in case no thresholds have been hit or exceeded for a certain period.

- The rule could be the following: after a given time during which the triggering threshold for increasing the max price has not been reached in any bidding zone of the SDAC, the harmonized max clearing price shall be set to the previous level he had and never be lower than the original level set in the first version of the methodology (3000 €/MWh).

- A trade-off between stability and flexibility should be considered; very frequent changes in price limits should indeed be avoided. We call for a public discussion with all NEMOs and ACER to define the relevant rule in terms of time / period after which the max clearing price could be decreased. Various solutions are possible such as a sliding period (sufficiently long) from the date of establishment of the max clearing price in force, or on the contrary a fixed date such as the start of a next calendar year or a next summer season. More generally, we call on all NEMOs together with ACER to organize a workshop with market participants to discuss the choice of all parameters embedded in the HMMCP methodologies (see as well below in the next questions).

6. NEMOs would like to consult on the duration of the transition period between detection of the threshold and entry into force of the new price cap. Shall this be shortened, increased, or maintained to be 5 weeks after the triggering threshold (60% of max clearing price) has been reached?

In principle, we believe that the transition period should be shortened while taking into account IT systems, processes and operational constraints, to guarantee free price formation.

- First, we would like to recall that those 5 weeks in the HMMCP methodology for SDAC were proposed initially as a reasonable duration to accommodate the changes implied by increasing max technical prices in IT systems and processes of both NEMOs and market participants and management of collateral issues by market participants. The new rule, if any, shall in no way endanger IT systems and processes related to SDAC and the length of the transition period shall not go below the necessary duration for implementation to be evaluated both by NEMOs[1] and market participants.

- A real increase event has now been experienced for SDAC, with the establishment of a new max clearing price at 4000 €/MWh on 10 May 2022, 5 weeks after the threshold was exceeded on 3 April 2022 for delivery date 4 April 2022. Hence, all NEMOs and market participants may have more perspective on the time which is necessary to make the max price limit modification.

- On the side of market participants, technically, the implementation of new price limits can be done in an agile manner.

- Again, we call for a discussion via a dedicated workshop with all NEMOs in order to evaluate more properly the rationale for the length of the transition period and then be able to set a relevant value.

In addition, we would like to develop and potentially expand the conditions for not increasing price limits according to the automatic increase rule. Currently, Article 4(1)(d) of HMMCP methodology for SDAC excludes the case when the triggering threshold is reached in bidding zones decoupled. It should be considered to expand the exception cases to IT issues, operational errors or corrupted data preventing a proper functioning of SDAC. A more thorough definition of such exceptional cases should be found, and the dedicated workshop can be a starting point for this.

Finally, concerning the announcement and publication by NEMOs to market participants, we believe that the rule should be amended as well. Currently, this is at least 4 weeks before the implementation and application of the new price limit, hence this lets up to one week as the new price limit is currently applied 5 weeks after the triggering threshold was reached. We request this delay being shortened to the minimum (e.g. one day if not the same day it happens) because it is of utmost importance that market participants are informed widely and as soon as possible (if not immediately) in case of changing price limits.

7. Do you consider the current approach to increase the maximum clearing price in steps of EUR 1000,-- still adequate?

We agree with the current automatic increase rule for the max clearing price. We agree with a choice for the increment step defined in a neutral and purely technical way. Again, we would welcome a public workshop organized by NEMOs to discuss this parameter of the methodology.

[1] The procedure giving the list of tasks to be performed by NEMOs in case of modification of the max clearing price for SDAC is detailed here: SDAC_OTH.

8. Do you think that the event that the clearing price exceeds a value of 60 percent of the harmonised maximum clearing price for SDAC in one market time unit of a day in single bidding zone is a sufficient trigger to increase the harmonised maximum clearing price for SDAC? For example: to instead as the basis for triggering a maximum clearing price increase to be given by a requirement that the threshold has been exceeded on multiple different days (e.g. separate SDAC trading days) within a given period.

On the 60% rule: any justification related to free price formation would be appreciated. This should be another point of discussion during the workshop to be organized.

On the rule related to the triggering threshold reached in at least one market time unit of a day in a single bidding zone: since price formation is at the MTU granularity, and price limits must be harmonized, we believe that this rule allows effectively to respect free price formation on SDAC.

9. HMMCP methodologies to describe also an automatic extension of the minimum clearing price when a certain threshold is reached?

Currently, no rule of automatic decrease is foreseen for the minimum clearing price for SDAC nor for SIDC continuous. The minimum limits are fixed, and no adjustment is foreseen in case such limits would be hit or exceeded. An adjustment might be considered both for the DA and ID timeframe if it appears that current methodology could hinder free price formation on the downward side, in consistency with the reasoning on free price formation on the upper side (cf. point (b) in our introduction) and pursuant to Article 10(1) of Electricity Regulation.

10. Any other views regarding the HMMCP methodologies for SDAC and SIDC?

As mentioned above, we call on all NEMOs together with ACER to organize a workshop involving market participants to discuss further all the parameters to be embedded in HMMCP methodologies, even more if new parameters are set and/or introduced (the percentage involved in the triggering threshold, the transition period before increasing the SDAC price limit, the increment step, the length of the period for the decreasing rule – if introduced, etc.).

- During such workshop, NEMOs and market participants could also discuss the introduction of plausibility checks by NEMOs when accepting market participant's orders to prevent false orders from being entered into the system and therefore affecting the market clearing price. Currently, for example, each automated system employed by market participants, can place market orders with unlimited quantities which brings a significant risk potential that could be minimized if NEMOs introduce a plausibility check here.

- Such a workshop shall be organized in complement to current consultation and before the final amendment proposal by all NEMOs is sent to ACER. It could be as well complemented by a study on collateral arrangements across Europe with an assessment of the risks and financial impacts associated. This would be a valuable input in any case.

On the sidelines of this consultation, we would like to raise the issue of some local rules in Europe which limit trading possibilities in intraday, while ID markets are used by market

participants to balance their positions transferred from the DA. In some bidding zones in Europe, (i) the transfer of imbalanced positions from DA to ID is forbidden and/or (ii) there are some trading volumes limitations in intraday (maximum open position). As long as those rules exist, in extreme tense situations, market participants could bid at any price. We call on ACER to tackle this issue which is discriminatory in these extreme situations, in the framework of this HMMCP methodology amendment on SDAC. When the DA clearing price reaches the maximum limit, we propose that all volume restrictions on intraday markets (including national restrictions) be lifted.

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- Growth, added-value, efficiency

Environmental Leadership

- Commitment, innovation, pro-activeness

Social Responsibility

- Transparency, ethics, accountability

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